Intuitionistic fuzzy shapley value for cooperative game based on the equal contribution value

When solving cooperative game problems in real-world scenarios, the cooperative profit allocation strategies of players pursue both efficiency and fairness. This study constructs an intuitionistic fuzzy squared contribution excess with Choquet integral, aims to minimize players' dissatisfaction to derive the equal distribution of contribution values, and replaces the marginal contributions in the traditional Shapley value with these values, thereby obtaining an improved Shapley value for intuitionistic fuzzy cooperative games. It is proved that this Shapley value satisfies the monotonicity condition and can be used to obtain allocation strategies through a simple algorithm, avoiding issues such as uncertainty amplification caused by fuzzy number operations. Additionally, this value maintains the properties of the classical Shapley value, including efficiency, symmetry, additivity, and anonymity. Through a case study, comparing it with three existing fuzzy cooperative game solutions shows that this value has small calculation errors, satisfies efficiency, and balances the fairness of allocation. This indicates that while preserving the properties of the classical Shapley value, it is more conducive to solving practical economic management problems.