邓浪, 何贻勇, 谭建国. 风险投资中的委托代理问题[J]. 云南大学学报(自然科学版), 2012, 34(S1): 1-5.
引用本文: 邓浪, 何贻勇, 谭建国. 风险投资中的委托代理问题[J]. 云南大学学报(自然科学版), 2012, 34(S1): 1-5.
HE Yi-yong, DENG Lang, TAN Jian-guo. The risk of investment in principal agent problem[J]. Journal of Yunnan University: Natural Sciences Edition, 2012, 34(S1): 1-5.
Citation: HE Yi-yong, DENG Lang, TAN Jian-guo. The risk of investment in principal agent problem[J]. Journal of Yunnan University: Natural Sciences Edition, 2012, 34(S1): 1-5.

风险投资中的委托代理问题

The risk of investment in principal agent problem

  • 摘要: 分别讨论投资人与投资家,投资家与企业家的委托代理关系.对风险投资人与风险投资家之间的委托代理问题,着重讨论了隐性激励的一种表现形式:声誉效用.在投资人和投资家之间是否可以达到帕累托最优的讨论中,通过模型最后导出:在仅有显性激励机制情况下,帕累托最优是不可达到的.对风险投资家与风险企业家之间的委托代理问题,通过道德风险博弈模型的建立,对其求解和分析.

     

    Abstract: This thesis discussing about investors and capitalists,capitalists and entrepreneurs respectively in two parts,discussing the relationship between them with principal-agent theory.For discussing the principal-agent problem between venture investors and venture capitalists,this thesis emphasize the reputation utility as one forms of implicit incentives.Whether we can achieves Pareto optimality between venture investors and venture capitalists I analyse it through a mathematical model,and I get the answer that only though the explicit incentive mechanism,Pareto optimality can not be reached.For discussing the principal-agent problem between venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs,I am establishing moral risk game model,to solve and analysis it.

     

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