何贻勇, 邓浪, 谭建国. 非完全信息下的民办高校契约设计博弈分析[J]. 云南大学学报(自然科学版), 2012, 34(S1): 6-9.
引用本文: 何贻勇, 邓浪, 谭建国. 非完全信息下的民办高校契约设计博弈分析[J]. 云南大学学报(自然科学版), 2012, 34(S1): 6-9.
HE Yi-yong, DENG Lang, TAN Jian-guo. Private universities contract design game analysis under incomplere information[J]. Journal of Yunnan University: Natural Sciences Edition, 2012, 34(S1): 6-9.
Citation: HE Yi-yong, DENG Lang, TAN Jian-guo. Private universities contract design game analysis under incomplere information[J]. Journal of Yunnan University: Natural Sciences Edition, 2012, 34(S1): 6-9.

非完全信息下的民办高校契约设计博弈分析

Private universities contract design game analysis under incomplere information

  • 摘要: 在教师聘任制背景下,民办高校教师存在教育服务能力和成本等私人信息时,与民办高校存在委托代理关系.在非完全信息下,从博弈角度分析民办高校如何设计最优契约诱导教师说真话,淘汰低水平的教师,吸引高水平的教师,并保证自身效益最大化.研究表明不同类型的教师都真实地报出自己的类型时,民办高校对各种类型的教师都应对应地给出各自的契约参数.

     

    Abstract: Private higher education teachers exist educational service ability,cost and private information,which exist principal-agent relationship with private higher education in the background of teachers' appointment.Weanalyzes that private higher education is how to design contract,induce teachers to tell truth ,eliminate low level teachers,attract excellent teachers and make sure itself benefit maximized from the angle ofgaming aiming at the problem of teachers' incompleteinformation.The study shows that different styles' teachers can know their styles,so private higher education should give respective contract parameter design for the different styles' teachers.

     

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